This letter was published by the World Council of Churches in 2006, but most of the elements in it are as relevant today as then. If anything, such a declaration might be even more timely at this present juncture, since the past six years have scarcely brought us any closer to a resolution of the problems. It represents a sincere attempt on the part of the WCC leadership both to be even-handed, and also to look beyond the present impasse to the wider problem of nuclear weapons worldwide and the danger they represent:
Executive committee statement on Iran and nuclear non-proliferation
The World Council of
Churches has on many occasions declared its enduring view that "the only
ultimate protection against nuclear weapons is their total elimination"
(EC, Feb 2004), prohibition and a mechanism of effective international
inspections and control (2nd Assembly 1954). The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty is the only agreement in international law that
formally requires these goals, and the WCC therefore regards it a
matter of fundamental importance that all states be meticulous and
unwavering in meeting their full obligations under the Treaty.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
specially mandated to monitor and confirm the adherence of non-nuclear
weapons' states (NNWS) signatories to the Treaty. It is the
responsibility of the IAEA to confirm that any and all nuclear programs
of NNWS are transparent and verifiably restricted to the peaceful
purposes permitted under the NPT, and thus it is also a matter of
fundamental importance that all NNWS Treaty signatories enter into and
fully comply with NPT Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA, and that they
ratify and implement the Additional Protocol to Safeguard Agreements
with the IAEA.
The WCC therefore reiterates its grave concern that
the authority and effectiveness of the NPT have been eroded by the
failure of its members to reach any agreement at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference on advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
efforts and by the further failure of the international community to
address the urgent nuclear disarmament imperative through the final
document of the 2005 World Summit.
The WCC is also deeply concerned that the authority
and effectiveness of the IAEA, as well as the objective of nuclear
disarmament, are severely damaged by the failure of Iran to fully and
unambiguously cooperate with the IAEA in verifying all elements of
Iran's nuclear programs as being solely for peaceful purposes. Iran's
history of clandestine nuclear research, its failure to provide the IAEA
full and ongoing access to all nuclear facilities, and its failure to
satisfactorily clarify all of the outstanding issues and questions
raised by the IAEA during the course of its inspections is a violation
of its obligations and undermines pursuit of the agreed global goal of
total nuclear disarmament.
It adds to the concern of the international
community, that this record of non-compliance has sometimes been
accompanied by hateful and irresponsible statements by the Iranian
leadership against the Jewish people and the state of Israel.
Just as we call on Iran to take special steps to
assure the international community that it is not pursuing clandestine
nuclear programs, we also call on the United States to take steps to
assure all non-nuclear weapon states that it will honour its 1995
commitment. The "negative security assurance," which was given by all
five of the officially recognized nuclear weapon states, was key to
facilitating the 1995 decision for the permanent extension of the
Treaty. We regret that President Bush placed the United States in direct
violation of that commitment when he pointedly refused to take the
option of a nuclear strike against Iran off the table in the wake of
reports by the New York Times on US planning for such an attack.
It is important for Iran to understand that its
obligations are not conditional on the actions of others. There is no
justification for Iran's violations of its IAEA obligations and the WCC
calls on Iran and the international community to meet their collective
obligations to pursue a peaceful and nuclear free world by redoubling
their efforts to negotiate a constructive resolution of Iran's treaty
obligations.
Such a resolution should include the recognition of
Iran's legitimate security needs and should respect its formal right,
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to use nuclear technology
and material for peaceful purposes. A successful resolution of the
crisis must also respect the legitimate security needs of the
international community by ensuring strict adherence to nuclear
non-proliferation principles and practices as embodied in the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, in the agreements and decisions reached at NPT
review conferences, and in related IAEA measures and obligations. There
is no military solution to this controversy. It should be handled
through diplomatic means in particular by increased support to the
IAEA.
Although Iran has the right to develop nuclear power
for civilian peaceful purposes, including the right to enrich uranium,
it is not an unconditional right. The right of access to nuclear
technology rests on the obligation to disclose all of its nuclear
facilities and programs to the IAEA, and to open all nuclear facilities
and programs to ongoing IAEA inspection. While we understand that Iran
is currently cooperating with the IAEA, and while the IAEA confirms it
has not uncovered any current direct evidence that Iran is actively
pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons, Iran has for now lost the
confidence of many in the international community because of its recent
history of clandestine nuclear research. As a result, Iran must accept
that it will have to fulfil certain extraordinary requirements in order
to earn back the international trust.
In the immediate term, the restoration of such trust
requires a verifiable moratorium on all Iranian uranium enrichment and
reprocessing efforts until the IAEA has established to its satisfaction
that all Iranian nuclear facilities are fully declared and that current
and future nuclear facilities will operate in accordance with IAEA
inspection standards. This is a confidence-building measure that does
not deny in principle Iran's right to develop nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes.
Ongoing confidence that Iran's nuclear programs are
exclusively for the peaceful purposes allowed by the Treaty requires
further that Iran ratify and fully implement the IAEA Additional
Protocol.
In recognition of Iran's right to nuclear technology
and material for peaceful purposes, the international community should
agree to establish a means to assure that Iran has reliable access to
fuel for its power-generating nuclear reactors. We further urge the
international community to move toward ongoing and permanent
international control of the nuclear fuel cycle along the general lines
proposed by the IAEA Director-General - notably, an IAEA-controlled fuel
bank that would provide fuel to civilian reactors unless ordered not to
do so by the Security Council.
In addition, a resolution of the current Iranian
nuclear controversy should include commitments and mechanisms to begin
to address broader security concerns, including attention to Iran's
security needs, steps aimed at normalizing its relations with the United
States and other states, in particular its neighbors, practical steps
towards pursuing the internationally agreed objective of making the
Middle East a nuclear-weapons-free zone, Iran's acceptance and
recognition of the state of Israel within the borders of 1967, and
Iran's support for efforts by the international community to put an end
to violence against unarmed and innocent civilians for political or
religious aims.
In calling on Iran to respect the integrity of all
states and to return to full compliance with its IAEA obligations the
WCC is mindful that other states are also in serious violation of their
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament obligations. The five nuclear
weapons state (NWS) signatories to the NPT have not implemented the 13
practical disarmament steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT review conference,
especially their "unequivocal undertaking
to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to
which all States parties are committed under Article VI." India, Israel
and Pakistan have remained outside the Treaty and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea has withdrawn.
The Executive Committee of the World Council of Churches, meeting in Bossey, Switzerland, 16-19 May 2006:
- Urges the Government of Iran to fully comply and cooperate with IAEA and Security Council directives and requests.
- Welcomes Iran's consistent disavowal of any intention to weaponize its nuclear capacity and we call on it to take all the steps and measures necessary to assure the international community of Iran's verifiable compliance with that pledge.
- Appeals to the United States to reconfirm its full adherence to its 1995 pledge, confirmed by Security Council Resolution 984, never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon state signatory to the NPT, according to the explicit terms of that pledge.
- Requests the international community, and in particular the members of the UN Security Council, to solve the controversy around Iran's nuclear program through multilateral diplomatic means, including by strengthening the IAEA capacity for inspections.
- Reiterates our call on the five nuclear weapons state (NWS) signatories to the NPT to accelerate their efforts toward verifiable and irreversible reductions and ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals as required under Article VI of the Treaty, to refrain from all research and experimentation related to the development of new nuclear weapons.
- Calls on the three states still outside the NPT, India, Israel, and Pakistan, to heed the repeated calls of the international community that each join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, as the 2005 resolution of the UN General Assembly emphasized (A/C.1/60/L.4), "promptly and without condition." We further call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rejoin the Treaty as a verifiable non-nuclear weapons state.
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